We analyze a rational-expectations model of price formation in an intermediategood market under uncertainty. There is a continuum of dyads, each consisting of an upstream party and a downstream party. Both parties can make speci…c investments at private cost. As in property-rights models, di¤erent governance structures induce di¤erent investments. As in rational-expectations models, some parties may invest in acquiring (common-value) information, which is then incorporated into the market-clearing price by the parties' trading behaviors. The informativeness of the price mechanism a¤ects the returns to speci…c investments and hence the optimal governance structure for individual dyads; meanwhile, the governance-structure choices by individual dyads a¤ect the informativeness of the price mechanism. In equilibrium, …rms and the market coexist and shape each other. In particular, the informativeness of the price mechanism can induce ex ante homogenous dyads to choose heterogeneous governance structures. (JEL D20, D23) 
Introduction
Since Coase (1937) , economists have sought to understand why …rms exist, given the power of the price mechanism as an informing and coordinating device. As Coase argued, "it is surely important to enquire why co-ordination is the work of the price mechanism in one case and of the entrepreneur in the other"(p. 359, emphasis added).
Signi…cant progress has been made in answering this question, including contributions by Williamson (1971 Williamson ( , 1975 Williamson ( , 1979 , Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978) , Grossman and Hart (1986) , Hart and Moore (1990) , and others. But …rms and markets have typically been seen as alternative ways of coordinating economic activity, rather than as two institutions that coexist and shape each other. That is, scant attention has been paid to the interaction between D. H. Robertson's "islands of conscious power" and the "ocean of unconscious cooperation"in which he envisioned such islands "coagulating like lumps of butter in a pail of buttermilk "(1928: 85) .
In this paper we explore how the informativeness of the price mechanism and …rms' integration decisions interact. To explore how these two institutions shape each other, our model incorporates two, reciprocal considerations. First, …rms operate in the context of the market: the informativeness of the price mechanism a¤ects the relative returns to parties' speci…c investments and hence parties'optimal choices of governance structures. Second, a market (for an intermediate good) is made up of …rms: the parties'governance structures a¤ect how they buy and sell in the intermediate-good market and hence the informativeness of the price mechanism. In equilibrium, these reciprocal considerations must both be taken into account.
The economic environment we analyze includes uncertainty. Formally, the uncertainty concerns consumers' valuation of …nal goods, but we discuss several other interpretations below. Parties can resolve this uncertainty at a cost. As in other rational-expectations models, the price mechanism both clears the market and conveys information from informed to uninformed parties. The fact that the price is not perfectly informative provides the 2 requisite incentive for some parties to pay the cost to resolve the uncertainty.
As one speci…c example, consider a U.S. steel producer deciding how much steel to produce. Demand for steel might depend on future construction in China, which is uncertain.
Travelling to China and conducting interviews could give a steel producer a better signal of Chinese construction and hence demand, allowing better decisions about plants, equipment and materials for steel production. But other steel producers, who choose not to conduct such research, could look at the market price for an upstream good (such as iron ore) and infer some of the information gathered by the …rms that did conduct research. This example parallels our model, in that it is the market-clearing price of an intermediate good (iron ore) that conveys information about the uncertain value of the …nal good (steel).
Many other interpretations of our model arise if we consider alternative sources of uncertainty, other than the value of goods such as steel. For example, the uncertainty might concern whether tari¤ barriers will change or whether a new technology will ful…ll its promise.
As in our example, this uncertainty could apply to activities that are upstream or downstream from the intermediate-good market for which we analyze rational-expectations pricing. Interestingly, however, not all sources of uncertainty will do: our rational-expectations model applies to common-rather than private-value uncertainty. An analogous distinction arises in auction theory, where the winner's curse (i.e., updating about other bidders' signals if your bid wins the auction) arises only under common-rather than private-value uncertainty.
A similar logic holds here. As Grossman (1981: 555) puts it, in non-stochastic (and certain stochastic) economies, "No one tries to learn anything from prices [because] there is nothing for any individual to learn" (as may be the case under private-value uncertainty).
Often, however, there is something to learn from prices-such as when there is common-value uncertainty.
Our emphasis on the interaction between the informativeness of the price mechanism and …rms'integration decisions seems new. That is, while Coase was explicit that the "price mechanism" is the chief alternative to internal organization, and Williamson's (1975) title famously emphasized "Markets" as the alternative to hierarchy, over the next 35 years, the market disappeared from the literature on …rms'boundaries. Instead, the literature focused on non-integration versus integration, with the discussion of non-integration emphasizing hold-up costs rather than the market's price mechanism. In fact, even Williamson's early work (1971: 114) adopted this approach, suggesting that "…at is frequently . . . more e¢ cient
[than] haggling,"thereby emphasizing the haggling of non-integration rather than the price mechanism of the market. Similarly, Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978: 298) emphasize hold-up by arguing that "as assets become more speci…c and more appropriable quasi-rents are created . . . , we are more likely to observe vertical integration." Likewise, Grossman and Hart (1986: 590) began by asking "What is a …rm?" and developed an important answer involving residual rights of control but again ignored the price mechanism, instead emphasizing hold-up as the consequence of divided control.
The ensuing literatures on transaction costs and property rights have greatly enhanced our understandings of the costs and bene…ts of integration. Furthermore, both of these approaches have been fruitfully applied in many other …elds of economics.
1 But the literature on …rms' boundaries, with its focus on the consequences of divided control rather than on the price mechanism, has become completely divorced from both Coase's (1937: 359) original framing and the "Markets" aspect of Williamson's (1975) apt title. In this paper, therefore, we bring the informativeness of the price mechanism back into the theory of …rms' boundaries.
2 1 For surveys, see Hart (1995) and Macher & Richman (2008) . Many make-or-buy questions have been analyzed in these terms, for example: internal versus external capital markets (Gertner et al. (1994) ), inhouse versus outsourced research and development (Aghion & Tirole (1994) ), real versus formal authority (Aghion & Tirole (1997) ), public versus private provision of services (Hart et al. (1997) ), macroeconomic issues (Caballero & Hammour (1998) ), intra-versus inter-…rm international trade (Antràs (2003) ), and more.
2 Grossman & Helpman (2002) , Legros & Newman (2008a) , Legros & Newman (2008b) and Legros & Newman (2009) analyze other interactions between …rms'integration decisions and the market, but they focus on interactions that do not involve the informativeness of the price mechanism. In these models, supply and demand determine prices, which in turn determine the returns to the parties'actions and hence the parties' optimal governance structures; meanwhile, the parties' actions in turn determine supply and demand, so governance and pricing interact. As Grossman (1981: 555) notes, such Walrasian equilibria are not useful "as a tool for thinking about how goods are allocated... when...information about the future...a¤ects current prices."
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In the spirit of Hayek (1945) , we view the market as informing and coordinating through the price mechanism. We therefore develop a rational-expectations model similar to Grossman and Stiglitz (1976, 1980) but designed to apply to goods markets (as opposed to …-nancial markets), with (a) positive prices and quantities and (b) persistent participants (as opposed to transitory noise traders). In Gibbons, Holden, and Powell (2009; hereafter GHP) , we develop such a rational-expectations model for a goods market, but for the GrossmanStiglitz case of individual investors. Relative to rational-expectations pricing models such as Grossman-Stiglitz (and GHP) , the novel component in this paper is the analysis of alternative governance structures. Speci…cally, we enrich GHP to allow for production by dyads (with two feasible governance structures, depending on which party owns an alienable asset) rather than only individual investors.
To model these dyads, we develop a simpli…ed version of the classic property-rights theory (PRT) initiated by Grossman and Hart. To keep things simple, our property-rights model involves two parties and a single alienable asset. Regardless of who owns the asset, each party can make a speci…c investment, but the returns to these investments depend on who owns the asset. Following the PRT (i.e., analyzing one dyad in isolation) reveals that the optimal ownership structure is determined by the marginal returns to these investments.
In our model all dyads are homogeneous ex ante, so a PRT analysis of a single dyad would prescribe that all dyads choose the same ownership structure. Relative to the PRT, the novel component of our model is the inclusion of the informativeness of the price mechanism, which endogenizes the returns to the parties'speci…c investments and hence creates an industrylevel determinant of an individual dyad's choice of governance structure.
In summary, our model integrates two familiar approaches: rational expectations (where an imperfectly informative price mechanism both permits rational inferences by some parties and induces costly information acquisition by others) and property rights (where equilibrium investments depend on the parties' governance structure and asset ownership is chosen to induce second-best investments). Our main result is that, even though all dyads are homo-geneous ex ante (and thus would choose the same governance structure in a PRT analysis), in the presence of common-value uncertainty, the informativeness of the price mechanism yields an industry equilibrium that often involves identical dyads choosing di¤erent governance structures. To explain this result, we describe the model in more detail (for the interpretation where the uncertainty concerns the value of …nal goods, as in our steel example).
In each dyad the two parties are upstream and downstream in a production process that can transform an intermediate good (a "widget") into a …nal good. Upstream parties may be endowed with a widget. Upstream parties that are endowed with a widget can sell it in the widget market, and any party may purchase a widget from the market. The alienable asset is a machine that can transform one widget into one …nal good (at a cost). Upstream parties may make investments that reduce the cost of operating the machine; we therefore think of upstream parties as having human capital that is relevant to the production of …nal goods. Downstream parties may make investments that deliver information about the value of a …nal good in the consumer market; we therefore think of downstream parties as having human capital that is relevant to the marketing of …nal goods.
As in the PRT, the parties'incentives to make investments depend on asset ownership.
In particular, in our model, only the party that owns the machine has an incentive to invest.
Thus, in dyads where the downstream party owns the machine, the downstream party invests in information about the value of the …nal good, whereas in dyads where the upstream party owns the machine, the upstream party invests instead in cost reduction and relies solely on the price mechanism for information about the value of the …nal good. Naturally, if the price mechanism is more informative, the returns to investing in information are lower so dyads have a greater incentive to choose upstream ownership and invest instead in cost reduction.
As in rational-expectations models, however, when fewer parties invest in information, the price mechanism becomes less informative, thereby making downstream ownership more attractive. An industry equilibrium must balance these two forces. We show that a 6 unique equilibrium exists and is often interior. In this sense, the price mechanism induces heterogenous behavior among homogeneous dyads.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we specify and discuss the model. Section 3 analyzes the integration decision of a single dyad in isolation, and Section 4 analyzes the informativeness of the price mechanism, taking …rms' governance structure choices as given. Section 5 then combines the property-rights and rational-expectations aspects of the previous two sections, analyzing the equilibrium choices of governance structures for all the dyads in the industry and hence deriving our main result. Section 6 discusses some implications of the model and Section 7 concludes.
The Model

Statement of the Problem
There is a unit mass of risk-neutral dyads that are exogenously matched to each other. Each The machine can be owned by either party, but it is relationship-speci…c (i.e., the machine is useless outside its intended dyad). If party U i owns the machine, we say that the governance structure in dyad i is g i = U; whereas if party D i owns the machine, we say that g i = D: We embed these dyads in our rational-expectations model of price formation in goods markets from GHP. A fraction y 1 of the dyads is endowed with a widget. In particular, Equilibrium in the market for widgets occurs at the price p that equates supply and demand (from informed, uninformed, and outside parties). In making supply or demand decisions for widgets, parties that are not directly informed about v make rational inferences about v from the market price for widgets. Dyads choose their governance structures (i.e., machine ownership) taking into account the information that will be inferred from the market price and hence the relative returns from the two parties'investments.
Timing and Assumptions
We now state the timing and assumptions of the model more precisely. We comment on these assumptions in Section 2.3. There are seven periods. In the second period, each dyad negotiates a governance structure g i 2 fU; Dg: under g i = U; party U i owns the machine that can develop one widget into one …nal good; under g i = D; party D i owns this machine. This negotiation of governance structure occurs via Nash bargaining. To simplify notation, we assume that dyads do not know their indices at this point and hence cannot condition their governance-structure choices on their endowments.
In the third period, parties U i and D i simultaneously choose whether to make relationship speci…c investments (or not) at costs K U and K D ; respectively. In partial accordance with the PRT, we assume that the acts of making these investments are observable but not veri…able, but we depart from the PRT (in a manner that is natural in our setting) by assuming that the outcome of the downstream party's investment (namely, learning v) is observable to only
In the fourth period, each dyad learns its index, i; and all U i with i y are endowed with w i = 1 widget.
In the …fth period, price formation takes place, in three steps. In period 5a, the parties In particular, any party may buy a widget, and any upstream party endowed with a widget may sell it (inside or outside the dyad). There are thus eight possible outcomes when the market closes, depending on whether upstream has a widget, downstream has a widget, and who owns the machine. As the analysis in Section 4 shows, however, the only relevant issue is whether the machine owner has a widget.
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In the sixth period, production occurs: if the machine owner in dyad i has a widget, then he or she can run the machine to develop the widget into a …nal good at cost c i i . We denote the decision to produce a …nal good by q i = 1 and the decision not to do so by q i = 0:
O¤ the equilibrium path, one party might own the machine and the other a widget, in which case the parties bargain over the widget and then the machine owner makes the production decision.
Finally, in the seventh period, …nal goods sell for v and payo¤s are realized. The expected payo¤s (before v is realized) are
Discussion of the Model
Before proceeding with the analysis, we pause to comment on some of the modeling choices we have made.
First, we assume that the machine is dyad-speci…c. This assumption allows us to focus on the market for widgets by eliminating the market for machines. By allowing both markets
to operate, one could analyze whether the informativeness of one a¤ects the other.
Second, we have only one alienable asset, in contrast to the classic PRT setting. Our choice here is driven purely by parsimony; extending the model to allow more alienable assets (and hence more governance structures) could be interesting.
Third, we have binary investments in cost reduction and information acquisition (at costs K U and K D ; respectively), rather than continuous investment opportunities. It seems straightforward to allow the probability of success (in cost reduction or information acquisition) to be an increasing function of the investment level, which in turn has convex cost.
Fourth, we assume that the exogenous aggregate endowment y is known and whether an individual dyad receives a widget is not revealed until period 4. The exogeneity of y eliminates inferences about aggregate endowments based on individual endowments. Revealing individual endowments in period 4 eliminates conditioning the choices of governance structure or speci…c investments on the dyad's endowment. The latter is not a substantive assumption (since w i enters additively everywhere), but we make it for notational simplicity.
Fifth, as in GHP, we assume inelastic demand z from an outside industry at any price p v: This uncertain demand plays the role of noise traders, making the market price for widgets only partially informative about v; so that parties may bene…t from costly acquisition of information about v:
Sixth, again as in GHP, our assumptions that all the random variables are uniform allow us to compute a closed-form (indeed, piece-wise linear) solution for the equilibrium price function at the industry level. This tractability is very useful in the computing the returns to alternative governance structures, at the dyad level.
Seventh, as in Grossman-Stiglitz and the ensuing rational-expectations literature, our model of price formation is not an extensive-form model of strategic decision-making (including information transmission during the price-formation process), but rather a reduced-form model of price-taking behavior. See GHP for an extended discussion.
Individual Dyad Behavior
As a building block for our ultimate analysis, we …rst analyze the behavior of a single dyad taking the market price p as given. To begin, de…ne the expected gross surplus (at the start of period seven) for dyad i as
11 Therefore, in period 6 (production), the e¢ cient production decision is
The maximized expected gross surplus in period 6 is then in all three cases, the machine owner receives GS i and the non-owner receives a constant.
These payo¤s determine the parties'investment incentives in period 3, as follows.
Let the subscript pair (I; 0) denote the situation in which D i invested and hence is informed about v but U i did not invest in cost reduction, (U; ) the situation in which D i did not invest but U i did, hence reducing production costs by ; and (U; 0) the situation in which neither invested. Now de…ne the following:
Formally, these expectations are triple integrals over (c i ; x; v) space:
where F is the joint distribution function.
Since one party's expected payo¤ in period 5 is independent of its investment, at most one party will invest in period 3. If U i owns the machine (g i = U ), she will invest if U; K U U;0 : Similarly, if D i owns the machine (g i = D); he will invest if I;0 K D U;0 : We assume that K U and K D are small relative to the bene…ts of investment, so at least one party will invest.
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To proceed, we need to compute the price function p (x; v) : This involves analyzing the behavior of other dyads, and it is to this task that we now turn.
Rational Expectations in the Market for Intermediate Goods
Recall that there is a unit mass of dyads indexed by i 2 [0; 1]. Who sells on the market and who buys? Dyads with su¢ ciently low development costs (c i ) and no widget may purchase one, and dyads with a widget and su¢ ciently high development costs may sell one. De…ne c D (v; p) = v p to be the highest cost at which a downstream party that has invested in information (and hence knows v) would be prepared to produce a …nal good, and similarly let c U (p) = E [vj p] p + be the highest cost at which an upstream party that has invested in cost reduction (but not information) would be prepared to produce. Supposing (as we will endogenize below) that a fraction of dyads have D ownership (and hence know v), whereas fraction 1 have U ownership (and hence costs reduced by ), the buyers and sellers of widgets are then illustrated in the following diagram.
Figure 2: Supply and Demand
Formally, dyad i sells on the market if it receives a widget (which occurs for a mass y of dyads) and its development costs c i i are too high to warrant production (i.e.,
Similarly, dyad i buys on the market if it does not receive a widget (which occurs with probability 1 y) and its development costs are su¢ ciently low (i.e., E x;v [vj s i ; p] p c i i ). Then, since ex ante investment incentives are identical for all dyads, supply of widgets is given by
and demand for widgets is given by
from inside the industry as well as z from the outside industry. The market-clearing price equates demand and supply, so substituting x = y v yields
The conditional expectation of v given p therefore must satisfy
where the equivalence relation reminds us that (1) must hold as an identity in x and v:
De…nition 1 The above analysis implies I = 0; and K U and K D small implies U 0 = 0. Let = I0
and 1 = U : The problem of …nding a rational-expectations price function in this model becomes one of …nding a …xed point of (1). In GHP, we solve for this …xed point, …nding it to be piecewise-linear over three regions of (x; v) space: a low-price region, a moderate-price region, and a high-price region.
Proposition 1 Given ; there exists an REE characterized by a price function
where
To build some intuition for this result, consider the …gure below, which shows the three regions of (x; v) space, R j for j = 1; 2; 3: The low-price region R 1 begins from the lowest feasible price, p L at ( x; v) ; and extends up to the price p at ( x; v) : The moderate-price region R 2 then extends from price p up to the price p at (x; v) ; and the high-price region R 3 extends from p up to the highest feasible price, p H at (x; v) : (1) and equating coe¢ cients on like terms so that (1) holds as an identity.
Industry Equilibrium
To recapitulate, Section 3 analyzed the production decision, taking p ( ; ) as exogenous, and Section 4 endogenized prices. In this section, we endogenize the governance-structure choices of each dyad and de…ne an industry equilibrium as follows.
De…nition 2 An industry equilibrium is a set of dyads of mass ; a price function p (x; v) ; and a production allocation fq i g i2[0;1] such that 1. Each dyad optimally chooses g i ; with a fraction choosing g i = D;
2. Each party optimally chooses whether or not to invest;
3. q i = q i (q i ; s i ; p) ; and 4. The market for widgets clears for each
The choice in period 2 is between the two possible governance structures:
The ex ante expected surpluses from choosing the two governance structures are
In an interior equilibrium, dyads must be indi¤erent between the two governance structures.
Thus our goal is to …nd such that T S U ( ) = T S D ( ) and to characterize how varies as we change the parameters of the model. For simplicity we assume that K U = K D = K: (The case where K U 6 = K D is discussed in Section 6.) We therefore seek such that
or equivalently,
To keep notation compact,
We will make use of the following fact (which is derived in the appendix). Observe that the …rst expression is decreasing in and the second is increasing in :
This leads to the following characterization of industry equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Assume ( c c)
1. For all c; c; x ; v ; > 0 with c ; there exists an industry equilibrium. Further,
if the right-hand side of (3) is in [0; 1]. If the right-hand side of (3) is less than 0, then = 0; if it is greater than 1, then = 1. (1), and since the right hand side is increasing in , we must have that = 1. Otherwise, we want to …nd such that
Proof. If
which yields the expression in the statement of the proposition.
Proposition 2 is our main result, establishing that there exists a unique industry equilibrium and providing an explicit expression for the proportion of dyads who choose each of the governance structures. As the proposition makes clear, this proportion may well be interior.
Recall, however, that our dyads are homogeneous ex ante, so a PRT analysis (taking each dyad in isolation) would prescribe that they all choose the same governance structure. In this sense, the informativeness of the price mechanism can induce heterogeneous behaviors from homogenous dyads. To put this point di¤erently, in this model, the price mechanism can be seen as endogenizing the parameters of the PRT model so that dyads are indi¤erent between governance structures. In a richer model, with heterogeneous investment costs, almost every dyad would have strict preferences between governance structures, with only the marginal dyad being indi¤erent.
We are also able to perform some comparative statics. First, when the ex ante level of fundamental uncertainty increases (i.e., v is higher), the return to investing in acquiring information increases, so increases to the point where the price mechanism has become su¢ ciently informative to counteract the increase in v : Second, an increase in noise (i.e., x is higher) has an identical e¤ect. Finally, an increase in has two e¤ects. The …rst is the partial-equilibrium channel through which an increase in the bene…ts of choosing upstream ownership (and hence investing in cost reduction) makes upstream ownership relatively more appealing, reducing . In an industry equilibrium, however, there is also a price e¤ect. For a …xed fraction 1 of parties that invest in cost reduction, an increase in makes widgets more valuable, which in turn increases demand and hence average prices. Since dyads with upstream ownership purchase widgets over a larger region of the c i space than do dyads with downstream ownership, the former face this increase in average price level relatively more than do dyads with downstream ownership, so the price e¤ect militates towards an increase in : Which of these two e¤ects dominates depends on the parameters of the model. Proof. See appendix.
Implications
PRT Meets REE
Property-rights theory emphasizes the importance of speci…c investments for the choice of governance structure: whichever party's investment is more important should own the relevant asset. We can mimic the PRT by eliminating the role of the price mechanism in our model, by supposing that a dyad believes p (x; v) p for all ; x; v and hence does not recognize that prices are informative. placed with an equality. Generically, one of these two inequalities must hold, so the PRT prescription will be either that all dyads are integrated or that all dyads are non-integrated (because the dyads are identical ex ante).
In our model, however, the informativeness of the price mechanism endogenizes the returns to speci…c investments. In particular, dyads that would have chosen to invest in Nonetheless, this observation suggests that empirical tests of PRT that focus solely on the importance of speci…c investments may be misleading, by failing to consider the role that the price mechanism plays in endogenizing the returns to speci…c investments. Of course, …rms may well not be ex ante identical, and thus a mixture of these two e¤ects may determine the choice of governance structure.
TCE Meets REE
Explicitly commenting on Hayek's (1945) discussion of the price mechanism, Williamson (1975: 5) argues that "prices often do not qualify as su¢ cient statistics and that a substitution of internal organization (hierarchy) for market-mediated exchange often occurs on this account."
Our model allows us to assess those observations, if we can be precise about two things:
(i) what is means for prices not to "qualify as su¢ cient statistics", and (ii) what is meant by "market-mediated exchange." A natural way to think about the …rst of these is the following.
De…nition 3
The equilibrium informativeness of the price system is the expected
that is obtained by conditioning on prices.
In our model, the informativeness of the price system is given by
Naturally, this informativeness is increasing in the fraction of dyads that become informed, :
And in our model "market intermediation"also has a natural interpretation: it means relying on information about v from the price mechanism, rather than acquiring it directly (i.e., upstream ownership rather than downstream taneously to an increases in informativeness and an increase in : That is, it is possible for the price system to "work better" at the same time be used less. For example, it is straightforward to see that an increase in x decreases and decreases informativeness.
And an increase in c c can do likewise, as reported in the following result.
Proposition 4 Assume ( c c)
2 ( c c) ;
Proof. See appendix.
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REE Meets PRT
A …nal observation is that the theory of the …rm sheds new light on the functioning of the price mechanism. Partially-revealing REE models compare the bene…ts of acquiring information to the exogenously speci…ed costs of acquiring information. As our model shows, what matters is not only these exogenous costs K D ; but also the opportunity cost of choosing a governance structure that provides incentives to invest in information (namely, the foregone opportunity for cost reduction). To analyze this issue, consider the expression for when K U 6 = K D :
Note the presence of production parameters, such as and K U ; which have nothing per se to do with market clearing or price formation. More importantly, note that comparative statics regarding the informativeness of the price mechanism, such as @ =@K D ; can depend on production parameters such as :
In addition to comparative statics that illustrate the potential e¤ects of production parameters on rational-expectations equilibrium, we can also say something about how the production environment a¤ects markets. For example, in GHP we showed that (as in Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980 ) market thickness depends on ; with concomitant implications for economic e¢ ciency and welfare. In this paper, therefore, market thickness depends on production parameters such as and K U :
Conclusion
Transaction-cost economics and the property-rights theory have made major contributions to our understanding of why some economic activity occurs within …rms. For almost four decades, however, these theories of …rms'boundaries have emphasized the hold-up costs of non-integration (at the transaction level), rather than the functioning of the price mechanism (at the market level).
Motivated by Robertson (1928) and Coase (1937) , we view …rms and the market not only as alternative ways of organizing economic activity, but also as institutions that interact and shape each other. In particular, by combining features of the property-rights theory of …rms' boundaries and the rational-expectations theory of the price mechanism, we have developed a model that incorporates two, reciprocal considerations. First, …rms operate in the context of the market (speci…cally, the informativeness of the price mechanism a¤ects parties'optimal governance structures). And second, the market for an intermediate good is made up of …rms (speci…cally, parties'governance structures a¤ect how they buy and sell in this market and hence the informativeness of the price mechanism).
To develop and analyze our model, we have imposed several strong assumptions that might be relaxed in future work. For example, to eliminate the market for machines, we assumed that machines are dyad-speci…c. Also, as in our paper on price formation (where we analyze individual investors instead of dyads), we ignore the possibility of strategic information transmission before or during the price-formation process.
In addition to relaxing our current assumptions, it would also be interesting to expand this line of argument beyond our current application (to …rms'boundaries). For example, a host of internal organizational structures and processes seem likely to be in ‡uenced by the information available from the price mechanism (including transfer pricing, resource allocation, and empowerment), but our elemental property-rights model of a dyad is too simple to address these internal issues. Also, as well as investigating the impact of the market on …rms, there may be more to say about the impact of …rms on the market. For example, it would be interesting to know whether the equilibrium informativeness of the price mechanism is socially e¢ cient and (assuming it is not) what features of …rms' production environment facilitate better performance by the market. Finally, note that
